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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Earthquakes are a reality in both Japan and California. Seismically active areas lie near 
and under high-speed rail systems in Japan and along the proposed route for the California 
High-Speed Rail Authority’s (CHSRA) developing system. Japanese high-speed lines 
have withstood significant earthquakes without a single loss of life. Their experiences are 
instructive for California as it develops its system.
The report begins with an explanation of seismology and the study of earthquakes in 
various parts of the world. It provides a brief explanation of plate tectonics and the types of 
seismic waves. Next, it describes how earthquake monitoring technology has developed, 
and how early warning of approaching earthquakes is now possible using algorithms to 
evaluate data collected by seismometers and accelerometers. 
The report then describes the history of the threefold aspects of seismic mitigation on 
the East Japan Railway (JR East), beginning with a study of the development of Japan’s 
earthquake early warning system. It next reviews the recent seismic history of Japan and 
the JR East infrastructure retrofits that followed each significant earthquake from 1978 
through 2011. Finally, it evaluates the planning and training involved in preparing JR East 
staff to assist passengers and staff in time of disaster.
Next, it describes the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, and its impact on 
JR East facilities. What began as a M 9.0 earthquake off the coast of Tohoku became a 
tsunami disaster because the earthquake was under the ocean. It disturbed the seabed 
and generated a tsunami wave that rose to 12 meters (39 feet), devastating many cities 
along the coast. The “triple disaster” was created when the tsunami wave overwhelmed 
the tsunami walls and flooded the nuclear power plant at Fukushima. 
The impact of the triple disaster on the JR East infrastructure provides many lessons about 
the value of various types of mitigation for the CHSRA system. The next section evaluates 
the value of earthquake early warning systems, including the systems currently in use in 
California and their possible application to high-speed rail facilities. Real-time earthquake 
engineering (RTEE) and real-time seismology (RTS) are described, and their relationship 
to a high-speed rail earthquake early warning system is explained. Public policy and 
government activities in the development of warning systems are also discussed.
Seismic retrofitting of rail infrastructure in Japan is evaluated for its applicability to the 
California high-speed rail system. Lessons are drawn regarding the types of retrofitting 
that may be beneficial and the differences in California’s geology that may drive the 
development of different engineering solutions for seismic threats.
The JR East earthquake early warning system stops the train, prompting a response by the 
passengers and staff. Staff training in Japan was largely responsible for the subsequent 
lifesaving activities that moved passengers and staff out of harm’s way. The types of 
training and exercise activities used in Japan are evaluated for applicability to California 
rail systems.
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The report concludes that the lessons learned from the experiences of JR East in the 
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake can inform decisions to be made by the CHSRA as it 
develops its route, designs its infrastructure and selects its train sets. The training lessons 
are equally valuable.
The report uses literature review, case study, and interviews with researchers and 
practitioners as approaches to understanding the history and current state of the EEW 
development and application to infrastructure, including high-speed rail. Articles indexed 
in scholarly databases and newspaper archives formed the basis for much of the literature 
review. In addition, the JR East system provided reports rarely available to Western 
researchers on EEW system performance, seismic resistance/resilience research related 
to columns, piers and bridges, and staff training. The authors conducted extensive EEW 
research through the Berkeley Seismic Laboratory, and structural engineering research on 
seismic resistance through private engineering activities, both of which are documented 
in sections of this report.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
3
I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2011, the Tohoku region of Japan suffered a triple disaster: the largest earthquake 
in recent Japanese history at moment magnitude (Mw) 9.0;
1 a catastrophic tsunami; and 
flooding of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, which led to the release of radioactive 
materials.2 Two rail systems operated by the East Japan Railway Company (JR East) served 
the disaster area: the country’s renowned high-speed Tohoku Shinkansen and a coastal rail 
line connecting the region’s farmers and fishermen to the markets of metropolitan Tokyo. 
While the government’s mitigation and preparedness measures successfully minimized the 
impact of the shaking, flooding from the tsunami overwhelmed both mitigation measures 
and community preparedness activities and led to the catastrophic failure of the nuclear 
power plant reactor.3
Among all the destruction, one success stood out: the JR East system’s mitigation 
measures, which include an earthquake early warning system, infrastructure retrofits, and 
staff training. Although the tsunami damaged most of the coastal rail line and washed 
five unoccupied trains off the tracks,4 its flooding did not extend inland to the high-speed 
rail line,5 which suffered no loss of life or rolling stock and, considering the size of the 
earthquake, experienced relatively little damage.6 This success was due to a combination 
of robust mitigation and preparedness activities, including automatic train system braking 
and electrical shut-off, triggered by the early earthquake detection system (EEDS); retrofit 
of the viaducts, bridge piers, tunnels, station buildings, and other facilities to withstand 
seismic shaking; and training of railway staff to direct passengers in post-earthquake 
evacuation and sheltering.7
As California develops a new high-speed rail system, it needs to consider adopting seismic 
mitigation measures with proven return on investment. The Japanese experience may 
help to inform those investments.
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II. THE SCIENCE OF EARTHQUAKES
In the mid-twentieth century, scientists determined that Earth is made up of more than a 
dozen separate tectonic plates that move against each other on a sea of molten material. 
According to this theory, new crust is created at vents along the sea floor, and old crust 
is recycled in deep-sea trenches.8 As the plates move, they may become stuck beneath 
Earth’s surface. When the pressure has built up sufficiently, the subterranean rock breaks, 
causing an earthquake. This break in the crust is called a fault.9 The place in the earth 
where the rock begins to break is called the earthquake hypocenter, or focus, while the 
point on the earth’s surface directly above the focus is called the epicenter.10 The greater 
the magnitude of the earthquake, the larger the area of the fault that ruptures, the greater 
the shift between the sides of the fault, and the longer the earthquake’s duration. Seismic 
waves travel away from the rupturing fault in all directions, and large earthquakes can be 
felt hundreds of miles away. Seismologists have recognized that earthquakes generate 
four different types of waves. Each travels at a different speed and can cause different 
types of damage.
PLATE TECTONICS
Seismic studies have led to the recognition of four types of tectonic plate boundaries: 
divergent boundaries where new crust is created and the plates pull away from each 
other; convergent boundaries where crust is destroyed as one plate is subducted, or dives 
beneath another; transform boundaries where plates move horizontally past each other 
and crust is neither created nor destroyed; and plate boundary zones – broad belts in 
which boundaries are not well defined and the effects of plate interaction are unclear.11 The 
Mid-Atlantic Ridge, which extends from the Arctic past South America almost to Antarctica, 
is an example of a divergent boundary. It accounts for the separation of the Americas from 
Europe and Africa. Iceland, which straddles the ridge, is being built by volcanic activity 
along the ridge, with the island divided between the Eurasian and North American plates. 
The region that includes the northern coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington, and 
their adjacent sea floor, is an example of a convergent boundary, or subduction zone, 
where the Juan De Fuca Plate is subducting under the North American Plate and sinking 
into the mantle.12 The San Andreas Fault system in California is made up of transform 
faults with slow horizontal movement of about 35 mm (1.38 inches) per year. 
Another type of fault is the blind thrust fault. Unlike plate boundary faults, blind thrust 
faults have no surface expression, making them difficult to map. When these faults shift, 
one side “moves upward over the other,”13 producing more vertical movements. This type 
of faulting was the cause of the February 9, 1971 Sylmar, California, earthquake (M 6.6) 
that caused collapses at two hospitals and the deaths of 65 people.14 Rupture on a nearby 
blind thrust fault was the cause of California’s most costly earthquake, the January 17, 
1994 Northridge Earthquake (M 6.7) with 61 deaths and $15 billion in damage.15
Tsunamis are commonly the result of undersea subduction zone earthquakes, which 
cause sudden vertical movement of the seafloor. This movement generates ocean waves 
that can travel at an average speed of 750 km per hour (466 mph) – roughly the speed of 
a commercial jet plane. When the wave encounters shallower water, as at the coastline, 
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it slows and the wave amplitude increases. Sometimes the trough of the wave arrives 
first. Then, the first sign of tsunami will be an unusually low water level, like an extremely 
low tide, in which the water quickly recedes and is then followed by inundation of coastal 
areas. The inundation can take the appearance of an extremely high tide, a series of 
breaking waves, or a bore (wall of water). The initial wave trough or crest may be followed 
by a series of wave trains that return within a few minutes to several hours after the 
earthquake.16 In 1965, the International Tsunami Information Center was established in 
Hawaii to issue tsunami warnings for the Pacific nations. Over time, its equipment has 
improved, and it now receives data from seismic sensors, buoy-based measuring systems, 
and tide gauges throughout the Pacific basin and in Hawaii.17 
On December 26, 2004, a M 9.1 earthquake occurred beneath the sea floor, offshore 
of Banda Ache, Indonesia, with a rupture length of about 1200 km (745 miles).18 This 
earthquake generated a tsunami that swept through the entire Indian Ocean, killing more 
than 280,000 people in 11 nations. At that time, there was no tsunami warning system in 
the Indian Ocean,19 but this event prompted UNESCO to create the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
Warning System, which began operation in June of 2006.20 
SEISMIC WAVES
Seismic waves are created by a fault rupture, an explosion, or other movements of the 
earth. Like waves in a pond, they spread out through the earth in all directions from 
the source. Body waves, which travel through the earth’s interior, are either “primary” 
or “secondary.” Primary, or P-waves, arrive first and are compressional waves. P-waves 
travel through rock near the earth’s surface at about 6 km/s and also through the earth’s 
liquid core. Secondary, or S-waves, travel at about half the speed of the P-waves and 
exhibit movement transverse (side-to-side) to the direction the waves are propagating, 
and thus are unable to traverse the earth’s liquid core. P-waves travel more quickly, so 
they arrive at seismic sensors in advance of S-waves.21 
In addition to body waves, a seismic source, such as an earthquake, also produces surface 
waves – seismic waves that move only the ground near the earth’s surface. These waves 
appear only at some distance from the epicenter. There are two types of surface waves, 
each traveling at a different speed and producing a different kind of ground movement. 
Love waves, which travel at 2–6 km/second (1.24-3.73 miles/second),22 arrive first and 
cause purely horizontal, side-to-side motion. Rayleigh waves, which produce most of the 
shaking that humans feel,23 travel at 1–5 km/second (.62-3.1 miles/second)24 and therefore 
arrive later. Rayleight waves produce a rolling motion much like that of ocean waves, 
leading some observers to describe it as the ground “rippling.”
Most of the damage to buildings and infrastructure is caused by the shaking from S-waves 
and surface waves.25 Buildings are designed to withstand the vertical force of gravity and 
are relatively insensitive to P-waves. Before lessons about shaking effects were learned 
from recent earthquakes, little effort was made to protect buildings from horizontal forces, 
thus, during moderate earthquakes, structures were susceptible to damage by shaking 
from S-waves and Love waves.26
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Seismic waves generally propagate uniformly away from their source; however, seismic 
waves propagate at different speeds through the earth due to its layered composition. 
When seismic waves hit a boundary, such as the one between the earth’s mantle and 
crust, they may be reflected causing them to hit the surface at the same location and at 
the same time as other waves arriving directly from the quake. This is known as the Moho 
effect,27 and it causes increased amplitudes of ground motion (or shaking), usually about 
100 km (62 miles) from the epicenter.28 Such a ‘focusing’ effect was observed during 
the Loma Prieta earthquake, an earthquake with magnitude 6.9, which struck the San 
Francisco Bay Area on the evening of October 17, 1989, at 5:04 pm local time. That 
event’s epicenter was approximately 35 km (22 miles) southwest of San Jose, California, 
but did the greatest damage in Oakland, 65 km north-northeast of San Jose, where the 
Interstate 880 Cypress Viaduct and a section of the upper tier of the San Francisco-
Oakland Bay Bridge collapsed,29 and in San Francisco, 65 km (40 miles) northwest of San 
Jose, where soft story homes pancaked in the Marina District, and elevated sections of 
Interstate 280 were damaged.30 Surface shaking at frequencies that affect buildings and 
structures usually results from shallow earthquakes rather than deeper ones.31 
Since earthquakes can vary greatly in size, they are described using a logarithmic scale 
called a magnitude scale (M). Each unit of an earthquake’s magnitude indicates a change 
by a factor of ten; thus, a M 4.0 earthquake is ten times larger than a M 3.0 quake. The first 
magnitude scale for California earthquakes, now called the local or Richter magnitude, 
was defined in 1935 by Charles Richter and Beno Gutenberg. The scale measured 
the amplitude from an earthquake recorded by a standard seismograph invented by 
Wood and Anderson. For an earthquake at a distance of 100 km (60 miles) from the 
seismograph, a M 3.0 earthquake would register with an amplitude of 1 mm (0.04 in) 
while an earthquake with M 4.0 would show an amplitude of 10 mm (0.4 in). The Wood-
Anderson seismograph has several limitations, among them the fact that the paper is 
only 30 cm (~12 in) across, so the local or Richter magnitude scale is reliable only for 
earthquakes with magnitudes up to about M 6. Since the development of the Richter 
magnitude, gains have been made in both our understanding of the physics of earthquakes 
and in the instrumentation for recording them. It is now known that an earthquake record 
with an amplitude 10 times greater than another releases approximately 32 times more 
energy. For example, a M 4.0 earthquake releases 32 times more energy than a M 3.0 
earthquake and a M 9.0 earthquake releases 32 times more energy than a M 8.0. Based 
on the physical understanding of earthquakes, seismologists now prefer to use the 
moment magnitude scale to all other types of historically defined magnitudes, particularly 
for larger earthquakes. Moment magnitude, usually represented as Mw, describes the 
moment released in a quake, which increases with the area of the rupture zone and the 
amount of offset and scales approximately with the energy. For example, the rupture of the 
M 9.1 earthquake in the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004 covered 199,947 square km 
(77,200 square miles). The moment can be determined by estimating the size of the 
rupture zone from the locations of aftershocks, or it can be modeled from seismic or GPS 
recordings32 of the earthquake. GPS recordings can also be used to monitor the direction 
and rate of drift of the tectonic plates after a rupture, and also to monitor elevation changes 
that may have occurred during the earthquake.33
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Figure 1. Comparison of the Moment Magnitude and Corresponding Energy 
Release of Large Earthquakes and Other High-energy Phenomena
Source: Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology.
Since moment magnitude is defined as the measure of the total moment released during 
a rupture, an earthquake has a single moment magnitude. However, local shaking 
intensity, which is reported on a 12-level Modified Mercalli scale, is a useful measure for 
understanding the impact of an earthquake. The intensity is different at various locations, 
depending on distance from the fault and the geology and surface conditions at the site. 
The shaking intensity is a parameter determined for each point in the region and describes 
specific observed impacts (Table 1).34
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Table 1. Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale
Intensity Effect on People and Property
I Rarely felt by people except in special circumstances
II Felt by a few at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings
III Felt by people indoors and on upper floors; vibrations similar to a passing truck
IV Felt indoors and sometimes outdoors, cars rock, dishes, windows and doors disturbed, walls make 
cracking sound
V Felt by everyone, dishes and windows may break, unstable objects may overturn, pendulum clocks 
may stop
VI Felt by all, heavy furniture moves, plaster may fall, slight damage
VII Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary 
structures; considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken.
VIII Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable damage in ordinary substantial buildings 
with partial collapse. Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, 
monuments, walls. Heavy furniture overturned.
IX Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame structures thrown out of 
plumb. Damage great in substantial buildings, with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations.
X Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame structures destroyed with 
foundations. Rails bent.
XI Few, if any (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed. Rails bent greatly.
XII Damage total. Lines of sight and level are distorted. Objects thrown into the air.
Source: USGS, 2013c.
Scientists at the United States Geological Survey’s (USGS) National Earthquake Information 
Center (NEIC) have asked the public to join them in collecting information about earthquakes. 
The “Did You Feel It?” website allows anyone to register how much shaking they felt for 
a specific event. The information is sometimes added to the “Shake Map,” which shows 
intensity and extent of shaking. These observations contribute information to guide the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) response to disaster events.35
Earthquakes are a daily threat in Japan, which sits at the junction of four tectonic plates: 
the Eurasian Plate, the North American Plate, the Philippine Plate and the Pacific Plate. 
During the twentieth century, Japan had 13 significant earthquakes, resulting in more than 
150,000 deaths and the collapse of “hundreds of thousands of buildings.”36 For example, on 
September 1, 1923, the Great Kanto Earthquake (M 7.9) caused a fire and a 12 m (39-foot) 
tsunami; these two combined events killed 143,000 people.37 They destroyed large 
sections of both Tokyo, Japan’s capital, and Yokohama, its trade center with the Western 
nations. The earthquake’s shaking lasted for 14 seconds; the resulting tsunami wave was 
6 m (20 feet) high when it washed over Kamakura on the Honshu coast. The shaking led to 
fires throughout Tokyo that burned for two days. About half of the buildings were destroyed 
because the broken water mains meant the fire department had nothing with which to 
douse them. Yokohama, built on mud flats, had wholesale building collapses and fires that 
destroyed most of the city.38
Table 2 shows the most significant Japanese earthquakes of the twentieth century.
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Table 2. Significant Japanese Earthquakes of the Twentieth Century
Name Date Moment Magnitude Deaths
Kanto Plain (Tokyo) 9/1/23 7.9 143,000
Tango 3/7/27 7.6 3,020
Sanriku 3/2/33 8.4 2,990
Tottori 9/10/43 7.4 1,190
Tonankai 12/7/44 8.1 1,223
Mikawa 1/12/45 7.1 1,961
Nankaido 12/20/46 8.1 1,330
Fukui 6/28/48 7.3 3,769
Hokkaido 3/4/52 8.1 31
Niigata 6/16/64 7.5 26
Off East Coast of Honshu 5/16/68 8.2 47
Miyagi 6/12/78 7.4 27
Kobe 1/17/95 7.2 5,502
Note: There were also many earthquakes with magnitude greater than 7.0 along the coast of Honshu that caused 
no fatalities.
Source: USGS, 2013b; Nakamura and Saita, 2007b.
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The earliest mention of a seismic sensor comes from ancient China, where Chang Heng 
developed the first seismoscope in 132 A.D. European interest in seismoscopes increased 
in the late 1700s due to a series of earthquakes around the Mediterranean Sea. These 
primitive instruments were pendulum systems, which could etch recordings, but provided 
no time information. Early attempts at incorporating temporal information involved basins 
of mercury, such as those in use by Cavalli in 1784 and Mallet in 1851. Seismographs, 
which provide a written record, in one form or another, of shaking as a function of time, 
were invented in the late 1800s. The earliest seismographs employed pendulums and 
were built in Italy by Filippo Cecchi in 1875. Soon after, large advances in damping and 
recording resulted in improved instrumentation, developed by Milne, Ewing, Gray, Omori, 
and Wiechert. The seismometers in use today have digital output and record relative 
motion with respect to the earth as a function of time.39 
The concept of an earthquake early warning system appears to have originated with 
Dr. J.D. Cooper of San Francisco. On November 3, 1868, he wrote a letter to the editor of the 
San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin suggesting the development of an automatic electricity-
based sensor system, using the city’s existing telegraph lines to warn the public of an 
impending earthquake through the use of an alarm bell to be triggered by electric current 
over the telegraph wires.40 He was interested in protecting the population of San Francisco 
from earthquake damage following the 1868 earthquake on the Hayward fault. Although 
the technology of the time did not permit the development of the envisioned telegraph-
based system,41 the first seismic network in the Western Hemisphere was installed by 
UC Berkeley, with one station on the Berkeley campus and another at the Mt. Hamilton 
Observatory. The first strong-motion seismograph was developed in Japan (1953), more 
than 80 years after Dr. Cooper’s proposal paved the way for modern earthquake early 
warning systems. Japan’s development of an earthquake early warning system will be 
discussed in the next section, which focuses on JR East’s seismic mitigation project.
The next improvement in earthquake monitoring came when the United States and Russia 
(then the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) concluded the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which 
“prohibits nuclear weapons tests ‘or any other nuclear explosion’ in the atmosphere, in outer 
space, and under water. While not banning tests underground, the Treaty does prohibit 
nuclear explosions in this environment if they cause ‘radioactive debris to be present outside 
the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control’ the explosions were 
conducted.” Verification of the cessation of testing required the installation of sensors, which 
could distinguish between earthquakes and nuclear tests, to monitor treaty compliance. This 
required that seismic events smaller than M 4.75 would have to be monitored globally. For 
this purpose, the Worldwide Standardized Seismographic Network (WWSSN) was created 
in 1963. In addition to improving monitoring for nuclear tests, the new seismic network 
allowed “seismologists to map precisely the zones of earthquake concentration worldwide.” 
The network included 75 stations in 40 countries, and 20 US states.42
The National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) started in 1966 in Rockville, Maryland, 
as part of the National Ocean Survey, an agency of the Department of Commerce. In 
1972, it was moved to Boulder, Colorado, and became part of the USGS. In 1974, it moved 
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to a more resilient location,43 its current home in Golden, Colorado, against the Rocky 
Mountains with a lower seismic hazard than other areas in the west. It has three missions:
• Identify and characterize earthquakes around the world using a network of 2,000 
sensors,44 and rapidly disseminate this information;
• Maintain a database of seismic activity based on national and global networks using 
internet and satellite acquired data;
• Conduct research to improve the understanding of earthquakes to better mitigate 
risks to humans.45
The focus of NEIC is to collect and disseminate information to scientists, first responders, 
Red Cross, USAID and other government agencies, the media, and the public. The seismic 
networks from which the NEIC collects information are worldwide, based on international 
agreements for data sharing.46
In 1984, the Global Seismographic Network (GSN) was established. This partnership 
between the USGS, the National Science Foundation, and the Incorporated Research 
Institutions for Seismology (IRIS) provides a permanent digital network of global 
instruments for monitoring and research. Currently, the GSN includes over 150 modern 
seismic stations around the globe.
In 1997, Congress authorized the development of a “real-time seismic warning system” 
for the United States. In the summer of 2000, strong-motion instruments for the Advanced 
National Seismic System (ANSS) were installed in San Francisco, Salt Lake City and 
Seattle, followed by more than 100 additional instruments in other locations over the next 
2 years. 
California developed a strong-motion instrumentation program (SB 1374) following the 
1971 Sylmar earthquake. Additional funding (SB 593) was provided after the Whittier 
Narrows Earthquake of 1987. The goal was to collect data on building performance during 
earthquake-induced shaking to enable engineers to design structures that are more 
resistant to earthquakes. “Accelerographs” were installed in 650 locations representing 
various types of soil, and “earthquake monitoring devices” were installed in 170 buildings 
(including hospitals and essential services buildings), 20 dams and 60 bridges. The 
California Strong Motion Instrumentation Program (CSMIP) is based at the California 
Geological Survey (CGS). It uses real-time telemetry as well as dial-up modems and at a 
few sites, still, the collection of paper records, to aggregate data after an earthquake. For 
example, data collected on shaking near the fault during the Northridge Earthquake was 
used to improve the Uniform Building Code for structures in near-fault zones, and to guide 
the development of more earthquake resistant design.47 
In 2000, the California Integrated Seismic Network (CISN) was formed as one of eight 
regional networks making up the ANSS. The network includes the USGS offices in Menlo 
Park and Pasadena; California Institute of Technology’s (Caltech) Seismological Laboratory; 
University of California at Berkeley (Berkeley) Seismological Laboratory; the California 
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Geological Survey; and the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) to monitor 
earthquakes. The CISN provides earthquake information as well as dedicated software for 
receiving and viewing earthquake information: CISN Display and ShakeCast. CISN Display 
provides software-based, rapid maps of earthquake information for emergency response, 
including ShakeMap, special reports, and links to external products, such as HAZUS, 
which overlays information on community infrastructure and construction.48 ShakeCast 
distributes ShakeMaps and includes post-earthquake automatic notification to users about 
the event and its relationship to their infrastructure. For example, the California Department 
of Transportation (Caltrans) uses ShakeCast to help engineers select which overpasses 
and bridges should be inspected first after an earthquake.49 
The USGS National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) has recently developed PAGER 
(Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes Response) to provide a rapid estimation of 
possible fatalities and economic losses due to an event. This has greatly added to the 
available information for post-event hazard analysis and response. The suite of available 
earthquake information products was rounded out by the addition of the USGS Earthquake 
Notification System. Using email, text messaging and Twitter, this alert service sends 
post-event notification of earthquakes that occur in areas specified by the subscriber, 
anywhere in the world. The notices, which include the location, magnitude, and depth of 
the earthquake, are currently received by more than 350,000 subscribers.50
In 2006, the USGS supported Phase I of the development and testing of real-time 
algorithms for earthquake early warning (EEW) in the state of California in partnership 
with Berkeley and Caltech, the Southern California Earthquake Center and the Federal 
Technical Institute in Zurich, Switzerland. The “proof of concept” earthquake for the system 
was the magnitude 5.4 Alum Rock earthquake on October 30, 2007, at 8:04 pm local time. 
This was the first moderate sized earthquake detected by the system and it highlighted 
the efficacy of early warning alerts. The earthquake’s epicenter was near San Jose, and 
the system sent a warning to the scientists 5 seconds before peak shaking was felt in 
San Francisco. Phase II of the project began in 2009 with the implementation of an end-
to-end test or “demonstration” system, which integrated the previously tested methods into 
a single prototype warning system.51 This end-to-end test prototype system, ShakeAlert, 
became fully operational in 2011 based on data from 400 seismic sensors throughout the 
state operated by the CISN and its partners. Alerts are sent out in real-time to beta users 
running the UserDisplay. The beta users include scientists, emergency managers, and 
the Bay Area Rapid Transit system (BART), among others. The UserDisplay is a Java 
applet that runs on a computer desktop. It provides information on the magnitude, location, 
estimated shaking intensity at the user’s configured location, and a countdown of the time 
until the S-wave arrival at that location. Phase III commenced in January of 2012 with the 
addition of a $6 million grant from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation awarded to 
the partners: the USGS, Caltech, Berkeley, and the University of Washington. This grant 
enabled the expansion of the California demonstration system into a prototype for the 
entire West Coast.52 
Many algorithm improvements, speed enhancements, and UserDisplay updates were 
implemented during the ongoing Phase III. One of ShakeAlert’s three algorithms, ElarmS, 
now only requires 100 ms of P-wave data to start the calculations. As a result, when the 
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recent La Habra earthquake struck on March 28, 2014, scientists only 30 km (18.64 miles) 
from the epicenter in Pasadena received 4 seconds of warning before the arrival of the 
shaking from the S-wave. BART, like the Shinkansen in Japan, is poised to mitigate hazards 
by using EEW. Trains automatically decelerate once an alert from ShakeAlert is received. 
“Within 24 seconds we can get the train to a complete stop.”53 During the past few years, 
several small earthquakes (~M 3), which occurred close to the epicenter of the 1989 Loma 
Prieta rupture, were detected by ShakeAlert. “[A]lerts were provided around 20 seconds 
before peak ground motion arrived in San Francisco, Oakland and Berkeley – illustrating 
what would be possible in a repeat of the devastating 1989 quake.”54 Thus, ample time 
would be available to slow or stop most trains in the areas where BART operates, and 
prevent catastrophic derailments.
ShakeAlert’s UserDisplay (see Figure 2) shows a simulation of the Loma Prieta earthquake. 
The blue house is the User’s location, the red dot is the epicenter, and the yellow and red 
circles are the P-wave and S-wave fronts, respectively. It displays the calculated 23 s until 
the S-wave reaches the User’s location, the expected moderate shaking intensity V, and 
the estimated magnitude of 6.9. 
 Figure 2. ShakeAlert’s User Display
Source: ShakeAlert Earthquake Early Warning, 2012.
Recently ShakeAlert developers have begun to incorporate GPS data to measure the 
gross movement of the earth’s plates as the rupture unfolds. The satellites are part of the 
U.S Department of Defense’s Nav Star System, which consists of 21 satellites orbiting 
20,000 km (12,427 miles) above the earth. They transmit radio signals that are used in sets 
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of four to determine latitude, longitude and elevation.55 In non-EEW applications, scientists 
use these stations to monitor the ongoing motion of the Pacific Plate and its surrounding 
continental plates along the Pacific Rim of Fire – the most seismically and volcanically 
active zone in the world.56 For EEW, real-time analysis of plate motion allows for better 
magnitude estimations for the largest earthquakes, which is important for ensuring that all 
affected municipalities receive appropriate early warning. 
Scientists would like to be able to forecast earthquakes far enough in advance to protect 
people and critical infrastructure, such as trains, and to interrupt dangerous activities 
that would be negatively impacted by shaking, such as surgery or hazardous materials 
mixing. The USGS has been studying the San Andreas Fault in Parkfield, California, 
“to monitor and analyze geophysical and geochemical effects before, during, and after 
the anticipated earthquake,”57 and to develop appropriate communication methods and 
systems for response to their possible warnings of a coming earthquake. The experiment 
sought to capture the characteristic rupture, which occurs on the same portion of the fault, 
at approximately 22-year intervals. At the time of the initial experiment, scientists expected 
the next rupture to occur before 1993 but had to wait until 2004 to record the next event. 
The experiment is ongoing. As part of the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program, 
scientists continue to collect data on the fault to understand its behavior, which they hope 
will someday lead to the ability to better understand fault processes and – perhaps some 
day in the future – predict earthquakes. 
In 2007 Dr. Elizabeth Cochran, now a seismologist with USGS, established the Quake 
Catcher Network (QCN) to broaden the range of earthquake data collection. She 
collaborates with Professor Jesse Lawrence of Stanford.58 People are invited to voluntarily 
join the distributed computing network by purchasing a sensor for $50, plugging it into 
the USB ports in their computers, and orienting it to North so that data describing the full 
movement of the earth at the site can be collected.59 Ideally, the sensor would be attached 
to a concrete slab to best record the shaking. Users with mobile devices can also add 
the accelerometers – built into their devices to protect the hard drive – to the network. 
However, since they move they cannot be oriented for directionality, and each requires its 
own calibration. Since these devices may be carried on a person or in a vehicle, the ability 
to sense earthquake shaking may be limited by external motion. The data is communicated 
from the computer to Stanford’s server via the user’s existing Internet connection. 
People in 67 countries are members of QCN.60 Stanford’s servers analyze the shaking 
information from multiple sites to better understand the distribution of shaking intensities.61 
This system helped to detect and warn of Chile’s M 8.8 earthquake in 2010, the M 6.3 
earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2011, and a M 4 earthquake near Berkeley in 
2012.62 Dr. Cochran plans to add smartphones to the QCN to better serve poor countries 
and to harden the wireless connections in more developed nations.63 A UNESCO report 
from 2014 estimates that 6 billion people, out of a worldwide population of 7 billion, have 
access to mobile phones.64 
While not as precise as the seismological accelerometers, QCN instruments provide 
supplementary information on ground motion at specific locations. They depend on 
private computers and Internet connections, which makes their use as an independent 
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early warning system for California impractical. However, their value is in gathering data 
from areas without one of the 400 CISN sensors. QCN sensors can also be used to 
blanket an area after an earthquake to collect data on aftershocks. For example, after 
the Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand, 180 of these sensors were deployed in the 
epicentral region.65 
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East Japan Railway Company (JR East) was formed in April 1987 when the government-
run Japan National Railroad (JNR) was separated into three companies: East Japan 
Railway Company (JR East), Central Japan Railway Company (JR Tokai), and West Japan 
Railway Company (JR West).66 Today there are also JR Hokkaido, JR Kyushu, JR Shikoku, 
and JR Freight.67 The new private system replaced the public system that was heavily in 
debt and suffered from deferred maintenance. To facilitate the privatization of the lines, the 
government assumed half of the debt.68 As shown in Figure 3, JR East provides bullet train 
and conventional train services to Japanese communities from Tokyo to the northern end 
of Honshu. The company serves 16.5 million people each day on 7,510 km (4,660 miles) 
of track. Its 2013 net income was $1,860,800,000, derived from the operation of conventional 
and high-speed (Shinkansen) rail lines, as well as 30 percent “from leasing restaurant and 
retail space in its stations and from managing shopping centers and office buildings on 
property that has been developed near its stations.”69 The daily income from the railroad 
alone was estimated at $430 million (4.5 billion yen) in 2011, of which $11.5 million 
(1.2 billion yen) comes from bullet train services.70
 
Figure 3. JR East Passenger Railway Lines
Source: Tanemura, 2012.
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JR East uses its non-train revenue to support investments in safety. After the Great 
Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995, the Ministry of Transport and the Railroad 
Bureau ordered the railroads to retrofit their facilities to prevent a recurrence of the damage 
to the systems. By the time of the March 11, 2011 earthquake, JR East had completed all 
of the ministry’s listed retrofits and mitigation activities.71 
The JR East retrofits and mitigation fall into three categories. First is an earthquake early 
warning system to slow and stop the Shinkansen to prevent derailments at high-speeds. 
Second is improvement to infrastructure, including viaducts, piers and bridge connections, 
to reduce damage to them in earthquakes. Third is training staff in passenger safety and 
evacuation procedures, including annual drills. Each type will be discussed below.
HISTORY OF EARTHQUAKE EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS IN JAPAN
Dr. J.D. Cooper’s vision of an earthquake early warning system became possible 80 years 
after his letter to the editor, when the first strong-motion seismograph was developed 
in Japan in 1953. A decade later, following the 1964 Niigata earthquake (M 7.5), the 
discussion of the need for an earthquake warning system for the Shinkansen, which was 
in the final stages of construction, was resurrected. Soon after, the 1965 earthquake in 
Shizuoka (M 6.1) caused some damage to the newly completed railway structures and a 
proto-earthquake warning system was put into place “with ordinary alarm seismometers 
and waveform recording seismometers.”72 The sensors were placed at 20 to 25 km (12.4 
to 15.5 miles) intervals along the track, and monitored the ground acceleration in real-
time. The seismometers were set to alarm if the horizontal ground acceleration exceeded 
40 Gals (1 Gal = 1 cm/s2, or one thousandth the acceleration of gravity).73 This level was 
chosen to avoid false alarms from small quakes and passing trains. 
This on-site warning system served the rail lines well, but a true early warning system 
for Japan (such as that envisioned by Dr. Cooper in 1868) would require a coastline 
detection system, and public alerts. The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA)74 installed 
a coastline system that began operation in 1982, using a triggered S-wave detection 
system, similar to the onsite warning system used for the Shinkansen.75 This “coastline 
detection system” sensed offshore fault activity (front-facing system) and relayed that 
information to the trains. Japan’s earthquake warning system focused on protection of 
the Shinkansen trains. A similar triggered warning system was created by Mexico in 1991 
to alert the citizens of Mexico City to expected shaking from earthquakes that occurred 
offshore of the southern and southwestern coastlines,76 and later Istanbul implemented 
a system for the Bosporus bridge.77
The next phase of earthquake warning progress was the development of a P-wave detector 
that provided some warning time for protective measures before the arrival of the damaging 
seismic shaking (S-wave). P-wave detection methods provide earthquake early warning, 
because they do not require strong ground shaking to trigger, but can provide warning 
information based on the compressional P-wave alone. Called UrEDAS (Urgent Earthquake 
Detection and Alarm System) in Japan, the system could issue a warning three seconds 
after the P-wave was detected. The prototype front- facing P-wave detector began testing in 
1984, and was operational for the Tokaido Shinkansen line in 1992. Its installation included 
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an automatic train control system, which cut off electricity to the trains and applied the brake. 
The same system was used for the Sanyo Shinkansen line in 1996. Installation of earthquake 
warning systems for the various Shinkansen routes is shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Shinkansen Routes and Earthquake Warning Systems
Name
Date in 
Service Route
Length
KM/Miles
Maximum
Speed
KMhr./MPH
Earthquake Warning 
System Date Installed
Tokaido 1964 Tokyo to Osaka 515/320 270/168 P-wave front alarm
UrEDAS
1992
Sanyo 1972/75 Osaka to Hakata 
(Fukuoka)
554/344 300/186 P-wave front alarm
UrEDAS
1996
Tohoku 1982/85
1991/2002
Tokyo to Morioka 593/368 275/171 Compact UrEDAS 1997-S-wave; 
1998- P-wave
Joetsu 1982 Tokyo to Niigata 270/168 275/171 Compact UrEDAS 1998
Hokuriku 1997 Takasaki to Nagano 117/73 260/162 Compact UrEDAS 1998
Yamagata 1992/99 Fukushima-Shinjo 149/93 130/81
Akita 1997 Morioka-Akita 127/79 130/81
Source: Smith, 2003; Nakamura and Saita, 2007a.
The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, also known as the Kobe earthquake, of 1995 
resulted in significant damage to the region’s transportation infrastructure, including the 
railway system, discussed in more detail below. The UrEDAS and the onsite alarm system 
both issued alarms, but the UrEDAS warning “did not arrive at the target area due to 
transmission failure, …showing the difficulty of controlling” messages to the trains from 
remote locations.78 Because the Shinkansen is closed each day from midnight to 6:00 a.m. 
for maintenance, no Shinkansens were affected by the 5:46 a.m. earthquake. However, 
regular trains were operating.
The onsite combined S-wave and P-wave alarm system, known as the Compact UrEDAS, 
was developed soon after, with a goal to increase early warning times for the trains. The 
system combined a new estimation algorithm with a system that included a velocity meter, 
an accelerometer and a computer-processing unit.79 The Compact UrEDAS was designed 
to “issue the alarm within one second of P-wave arrival.”80 In 1997, JR East installed 56 
sets of the Compact UrEDAS for the Shinkansen lines, but with only the S-wave alarm 
actively used. In 1998, the system was adjusted to be an “along-the-railroad, onsite, 
P-wave detection system.”81 By combining the P-wave and S-wave detectors, the Compact 
UrEDAS “achieves both rapidity and reliability.”82 Since the Tokaido Line already had the 
UrEDAS system, the new Compact UrEDAS was installed on the Tohoku, Joetsu, and 
Nagano Shinkansen Lines, and eventually also on the Tokyo subway system (2001).83
On May 26, 2003, the Sanriku-Minami (M 7.0) earthquake (also called Miyagiken-Oki) 
occurred in the northern part of Miyagi Prefecture. The Tohoku Shinkansen line received 
warning from the Coastline Compact UrEDAS front detection system using a P-wave alarm, 
which was issued within 3 seconds, and the alarm reached the line before the P-wave’s arrival. 
“The on-site Compact UrEDAS then issued the P-wave alarm one second after P-wave 
detection. After that, the onsite Compact UrEDAS re-issued the ground motion triggered 
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alarm before the S-wave arrival.”84 Only two trains, Yamabiko #59 and Hayate #26, were 
in high-speed operation in the warning area at the time. Yamabiko #59 received the early 
warning alert and came to a stop 3 km (1.9 miles) outside of the station and 10 km (6.2 miles) 
away from structures damaged by the earthquake. Hayate #26 was traveling outside of 
the warning area and ultimately received an alert 10 s after Yamabiko #59. Fortunately, the 
train did not cross into the area where the worst damage and track displacement occurred. 
It is estimated that due to the train’s high speed, passengers and operators may not have 
noticed the earthquake motion in the area, which exceeded 300 Gal. The warning system 
performed as expected, with the Coastline UrEDAS issuing the first P-wave alarm, followed 
by the three Compact UrEDAS sensors along the Shinkansen line.85 
On Sunday, October 23, 2004, the Niigata-ken Chuetsu earthquake (M 6.8) occurred at 
5:56 p.m., with the hypocenter almost under the Shinkansen tracks. This reduced the 
available early warning time due to the proximity of the fault rupture.86 The earthquake 
caused 35 deaths and 3,183 injuries. In addition, 6,000 buildings were damaged or 
destroyed and 1,300 landslides occurred.87 It caused “the most extensive structural 
damage that JR East has suffered”88 up to that time. Damage occurred at 86 locations 
on five conventional train lines, but the worst event was the first-ever derailment of a 
Shinkansen train, which occurred between Muikamachi and Nagaoka. While none of the 
154 passengers was injured, eight of the ten cars derailed, and 900 meters (984 yards) 
of rail line were damaged. (The extent of the disruption to railway facilities will be 
discussed below.) 
The P-wave sensor cut power to the train 3.9 seconds after the fault rupture began, which 
caused the brakes to be applied automatically. The driver also put on the emergency 
brake when he recognized the Compact UrEDAS alarm that states, “Emergency braking 
resulting from power disruption.”89 “The S-wave hit the train 2.5 seconds after the alarm, 
and one second later strong shaking hit the train, which continued for about 5 seconds.”90 
Because the train was already slowing for a station stop, the 2.5 seconds warning from the 
alarm allowed for additional slowing and was enough to avoid a catastrophic derailment91 
when the train encountered the section of track being displaced by the rupture, thus 
demonstrating the value of even a brief warning period.92 It took 66 days to restore Joetsu 
Shinkansen service and 65 days to restore service on the conventional lines.93 Regardless 
of the relative success of the Compact UrEDAS warnings, JR East invested 1 billion yen 
($9.5 million) to upgrade its earthquake detection systems as part of its 2009-2013 Safety 
Vision program.94
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Figure 4. Early Earthquake Detection System for Shinkansen
Source: Hiraoka, 2011.
The Early Earthquake Detection System (EEDS), shown in Figure 4, was the result of this 
investment: “the fastest early warning system in the world to detect P-waves.”95 When the 
earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011, there were 239 seismometers in the EEDS.96 
It shortened “the processing time for issuing the alarm and combined the functions of 
UrEDAS and Compact UrEDAS. … After the P-wave detection, [EEDS] can issue the 
alarm within one second and estimate the earthquake parameters in one second.”97 It 
integrates UrEDAS, Compact UrEDAS and AcCo functions, and has replaced the earlier 
sensor systems.98 In the first second after the P-wave detection, it can “estimate the 
earthquake parameters … can judge the dangerousness of the earthquake motion…and 
can output the information and alarm in real-time based on acceleration and RI [“real-
time intensity”].”99 “When the wayside seismometer detects P-waves, the system rapidly 
estimates the hypocenter and magnitude with a B-delta method.”100 The system cuts the 
electricity to the overhead wire, and the ATC (automatic train control) unit aboard the train 
applies the emergency brake when the power is disrupted. To prevent false positives, four 
sensors must be triggered for the power to be cut.101
EEDS can be triggered either by the arrival of a P-wave, predicting the imminent arrival 
of a large-scale earthquake, or by “detecting an S-wave over a certain threshold.”102 The 
order to cut power can come from the coastline seismometers or the sensors along the 
Shinkansen lines. On March 11, 2011, a Shinkansen train running through the Sendai area 
was traveling at 270 km/h (168 mph) when the P-wave reached the sensor in 3 seconds. 
While the train traveled 225 m (246 yards), the power was cut and the emergency brakes 
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deployed. In 70 seconds, when the largest vibration occurred, the train had traveled 4 km 
(2.5 miles) total since the arrival of the P-wave, and had dropped its speed to 100 km/h 
(63 mph). Within the 100 seconds since the brake was applied, it had traveled a total of 
4.4 km (2.7 miles) and stopped safely. This rapid deceleration prevented a derailment.103
Regular trains also benefit from the earthquake early warning system. Their notification 
system combines the coastal array of the JMA EEW and the wayside (along-the-rail) EEDS 
system of JR East to sound an alarm. The train’s driver then applies the emergency brake.104
For local use in specific facilities, AcCo, a palmtop seismometer, was developed. It 
“can indicate not only acceleration, but also the world’s first real-time intensity.”105 It is 
recommended for use in schools and factories. Because of its ease of use and portability, 
the AcCo earthquake detection system is used by the Tokyo fire department to detect 
aftershocks during post-earthquake rescue operations.106 Its first practical use by the 
Tokyo Fire Department was in rescue operations after the 2005 Pakistan earthquake.107 
It has now been adopted in Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan, as well as by the Tokyo 
subway system.
RECENT SEISMIC HISTORY OF JAPAN AND RAIL SERVICE FACILITIES 
RETROFITS
Japan’s culture of rail safety and emergency preparedness starts with an assessment of 
the hazards that impact the area under study. The JR East Safety Research Laboratory 
assesses the JR East operating system for engineering standards applications, causes 
and results of accidents, collision prevention, derailment prevention, and human factors 
that influence the safe operation of the system.108 Part of this effort is understanding the 
physical hazards to the JR East system, which is accomplished by mapping the known 
hazards to the lines.109 Earthquake fault zones, tsunami impact zones, and landslide zones 
are examples of disasters with geological causes where mitigation may reduce loss of life 
and property. At JR East, they have also recognized the need to plan for “natural disasters 
caused by abnormal weather,”110 and for events caused by geography and climate.111 
Building on lessons from the past has been the laboratory’s strategy for enhancing safety. 
However, starting in 2009, they added “the maximum scale of damage of the events we 
can imagine,” which included a great earthquake in Tokyo112 and coastal tsunamis.113 By 
2013, the focus was on a “system to evaluate seismic impact by quantitatively evaluating 
risks to the whole railway system at time of earthquake.”114
1978 Miyagi Earthquake
On June 12, 1978, a M 7.7 earthquake occurred near Miyagi Prefecture, off the east 
coast of Japan. The earthquake was in a seismically active area that includes Sendei, 
Ofunato, Ishinomaki, Shiogama, and Fukushima – areas later severely damaged by 
the 2011 disaster. There were 27 deaths and 1,600 injuries. The National Land Agency 
estimated total losses to infrastructure at $800 million.115 Of this, $38.8 million was railway 
damage, including bridge piers and bridge abutments that settled and were damaged due 
to “liquefaction and inadequate footings.”116 The earthquake also caused shoe damage to 
reinforced concrete (RC) viaducts and piers.117
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Train service was suspended after the earthquake, initially because of the loss of electric 
power118 and then to allow time for inspections. Service was restored “quite soon after 
repairs were made.”119 The new Shinkansen line extending to the northern tip of Honshu 
was under construction when the earthquake occurred. The elevated structures, which 
were built to 1971 design standards, were damaged at the bearing shoes and columns.120 
This was the first earthquake to cause “serious damage to railway concrete structures 
in Japan,” which led to a revision of the seismic design standards in 1983.121 While new 
structures benefitted from the design standard changes, the older railway structures were 
not all retrofitted. Restrainer cables and jackets were used to reinforce bridges, but RC 
(reinforced concrete) structures were reinforced only in areas near the expected Tokai 
Earthquake zone, and reinforced steel plating was used to upgrade the RC viaduct for the 
Shinkansen in Shizuoka, another seismically active area.122
1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake
On January 17, 1995, the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake (M 6.8) struck the southern coast of 
Honshu, causing 5,502 deaths, 36,896 injuries, and widespread shaking-related damage 
and multiple conflagrations.123 Of the 13 significant earthquakes in Japan during the 
twentieth century, this was the second most deadly, the 1923 Kanto Earthquake being the 
first.124 Estimated losses were $100 billion, or 2.5% of Japan’s GDP.125 
Damage to transportation infrastructure was widespread. Researchers from the National 
Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (NCEER) in Buffalo, New York, noted 
“strong ground shaking was responsible for inflicting severe damage to the region’s built 
environment including…railways.”126 One kilometer (.62 miles) of the Hanshin Expressway 
collapsed, along with 120 quays in the port. The number of destroyed buildings totaled 
150,000, including most of the ancient traditional homes with heavy tile roofs designed 
to withstand the region’s frequent typhoons. Railways were also damaged, with only 
30 percent of the tracks between Osaka and Kobe left intact. “Wooden supports collapsed 
inside supposedly solid concrete pilings under the tracks of the Shinkansen high-speed 
rail line, causing the entire line to shut down completely,”127 but 80 percent of these tracks 
were restored to service within one month.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
23
History of JR East Seismic Mitigation
 
Figure 5. Train System Damage in the 1995 
Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake
Source: JR East.
The RC viaducts in the Kobe area experienced shear failure to “beams and bridges that 
hold up the railway tracks.”128 This led to the retrofitting of RC structures, first in high-
density areas, setting a priority for areas with high probability of fault rupture.129 RC pillars 
were reinforced with steel winding, limiting shear failures.130
Early Twenty-first Century Earthquakes
The 2003 Sanriku-Minami earthquake (M 7.0) occurred in the northern part of Miyagi 
Prefecture. The on-site detector observed “acceleration along the Shinkansen line of 
300-600 Gal.”131 The earthquake led to a major landslide.132 The shaking damage to the 
Shinkansen’s RC viaducts led to retrofitting of structures on all rail lines, regardless of 
previous priority.133 
The first of two significant earthquakes in the west coast region of Japan occurred one 
year later. The M 6.8 October 23, 2004 Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake, which caused the first 
ever derailment of a Shinkansen train,134 was followed by the M 6.6 Niigata Chuetsu-oki 
Earthquake on July 16, 2007.135 Damage to the Shinkansen lines included ground 
settlement, bent rails, tilted poles and damaged signals.136 As described above, the Joetsu 
Shinkansen derailed, causing service interruption for 66 days.137
These earthquakes highlighted both the importance of the retrofits that were already 
underway,138 and the difficulty of conducting the construction work. Often shops were 
under the railway viaducts, requiring relocations before retrofits.139 Several methods were 
used to get around these limitations. Steel jackets were applied to RC viaducts; alternate 
materials jackets (fiberglass, plastics), rib-bar and rib plate, and dampers and braces were 
among the methods used for RC members.140 By the time of the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake, these Shinkansen retrofits were mostly completed.141
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The trains and tracks were also retrofitted to prevent “deviation and derailment.” The 
2013 Safety Vision program emphasized the installation of “L–shaped car guides, 
countermeasures against rail rollover, seismic reinforcement of elevated bridges.”142 
Structural retrofits were already underway before the Niigata Chuetsu derailment.143 
Three techniques have been used across the Japanese railway system. JR East uses 
L-shaped guides that have been attached to the train-car axle boxes to prevent derailed 
trains from overturning. On JR Tokai lines, anti-derailing guards prevent most derailments, 
while a “post derailment stopper” attached to the bogie reduces the chance of rollover. On 
JR West and JR Kyushu a safety guide fitting grasps the rails to prevent rollover.144 
JR EAST STAFF TRAINING AND EXERCISES FOR EARTHQUAKES AND 
TSUNAMIS
The third aspect of the JR East seismic safety system is the training and exercising of its 
staff for earthquake and tsunami events. JR East has developed maps of the geological-
based threats to the system, including “hazard maps for all the local segments of the line 
along the seacoast.”145 The system then created a manual for both train crews and the 
staff members at stations on how to respond to anticipated disasters, including ensuring 
passenger safety.
Staff members on both the Shinkansen and conventional lines are given training in 
managing passengers during disasters. The training is comprehensive and is administered 
not only to the train crews and station staff, but also to staff from the maintenance and 
repair offices and rolling stock inspectors.146 
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Figure 6. JR East Passenger Evacuation on March 11, 2011
Source: JR East.
September 1, 1923, was the day the Great Kanto Earthquake struck. Since 1960, 
September 1 of each year has been commemorated as Disaster Prevention Day,147 and 
the JR East staff members have a training session followed by an exercise. The training 
focuses on four areas:
• Confirmation and update of disaster control task forces at the headquarters and in 
each branch of JR East
• Review of the emergency organization and its functionality
• Confirmation of the safety of the employees and their families
• Provision of first aid, firefighting, and evacuation training at every workplace
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The training is followed by an exercise on the trains in which staff members practice 
assembling escape ladders (for disembarking when the train is not at a station), 
managing a calm and safe evacuation of passengers, and movement of passengers to 
a safe shelter area.148
Because many of the lines are near the coast, tsunami response training is included in the 
earthquake safety classes. JR East began by establishing tsunami preparedness zones 
along its lines and creating maps of areas likely to be inundated and the locations of 
evacuation centers operated by local governments. Using the localized hazard maps they 
developed a response manual for train crews and station staff members.149 Since the 
most likely source of a tsunami is a subsea earthquake off the eastern coast, training in 
map and manual usage is integrated into the annual event. In a real emergency, JR East 
dispatchers will generally advise train crews of the need to evacuate,150 but the crews 
may also evacuate at their discretion. In tsunami-prone areas, the training includes the 
following information:
• Assess the local damage, contact dispatch for evacuation guidance, or use your 
discretion if you cannot contact dispatch
• Lead an orderly and calm evacuation and see to passenger needs
• Have passengers and local bystanders assist the evacuees to shelter
• Get to high ground as soon as possible
• Do not return to the train until the threat of tsunami is past, or until the official tsunami 
warning is cancelled151
In an earthquake, the passengers may not know why the train is stopping, as passengers 
inside a moving train are unlikely to sense the seismic shaking. Therefore, the train 
crew begins the response by making an announcement about the earthquake, and, if 
appropriate, the tsunami warning.152
Pre-event guidance is also provided to passengers through posters and signage. For 
example, evacuation route signs are posted in railroad stations along the coastline.153 
Posters may also be found in waiting rooms at stations and in train cars. Instructions on 
the posters are as follows:
• Remain calm and follow the instructions of the train crew
• Assist the train crew with assembling the escape ladders and help other passengers 
to disembark
• After leaving the train, follow the signs to the tsunami evacuation center
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Figure 7. JR East Station Evacuation Map
JR East has been practicing for earthquakes since the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. 
This investment of time and effort was rewarded in the Great East Japan Earthquake of 
2011 (discussed in the next section). Although the quake and ensuing tsunami caused 
15,891 confirmed deaths and washed five coastal trains off the tracks, including a 36-ton 
diesel car, which came to rest 250 meters (273 yards) inland and 15 meters (49 feet) above 
its previous location, not a single life was lost among the train passengers or crew.154
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V. GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE
On March 11, 2011 at 2:46 p.m. local time, a M 9.0 earthquake occurred about 70 km 
(43.5 miles) off the east coast of Japan beneath the floor of the Pacific Ocean, where 
the Pacific Plate is subducting under the North American Plate, setting off a cascading 
triple disaster (described in Table 4). The JMA’s upgraded $600 million earthquake early 
warning system (EEW), in operation since October 2007,155 informed residents of the 
impending shaking via mobile phones, computer screens, TV, and radio. The immediate 
shaking was felt over hundreds of square kilometers, with buildings in Tokyo swaying. 
Residents of Tokyo received 30 or more seconds of warning through text messages sent 
to mobile phones, factories received emails to stop production,156 and people near the 
earthquake received 5 to 10 seconds’ warning.157 When sensors detect a P-wave the 
computer calculates its size and sends out the appropriate warnings. On March 11, 2011, 
that process took 8.6 seconds, providing valuable warning time.158
Table 4. Great East Japan Earthquake Facts
Origin time: March 11, 2011, 2:46 p.m., Local Time
Magnitude M 9.0
Tsunami height 9.3 meters (over 31 feet)
Major damage Fukushima Power Plant inundated, lost power, led to radioactive material leaks
Casualties 18,000 people dead or missing
Damage area 500 km2 (193 square miles) damage to Tohoku area
Damage cost 16.9 trillion yen in damage (US $188 billion) = 3% GDP or 18% annual government budget
Global effects Balance of trade impact limited, as area accounts for only 2.5% of Japanese economy
Source: Kanno, 2013.
Because the earthquake occurred at a relatively shallow depth, the seismic disturbance 
along the sea floor created a tsunami that drove into the northeast coast with a run-up 
of almost 38 m (124 feet). It devastated coastal communities, ports, and transportation 
systems, including the coastline trains and tracks of JR East. At one point, four trains were 
unaccounted for.159 The Shinkansen was too far inland to be reached by the tsunami.160 
The third disaster was the tsunami’s inundation of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, 
which sustained damage to the reactors. 
Over 130 aftershocks occurred the same day, with more than 400 greater than M 5 by 
May 5, 2011. More than 15,000 people were killed, over 5,000 were injured, and over 8,000 
are still unaccounted for. Evacuations along the coast and near Fukushima’s damaged 
nuclear plant displaced over 100,000 people. Damage exceeded $300 billion.161
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Table 5. Comparison between the Great East Japan Earthquake and the 
Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake
Great East Japan Earthquake 
(2011)
Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake 
(1995)
Magnitude 9.0 7.3
Area flooded by tsunami 561 km2 (216 square miles) no tsunami
Number of missing and dead About 20,000 6,434
Number of evacuees (Maximum) About 480,000 within Iwate, 
Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures
About 317,000
Completely and partially destroyed 
houses
About 300,000 About 249,000
Damage About 16.9 trillion yen 
(1.05 trillion Yuan)
About 9.6 trillion yen 
(599 billion Yuan)
Source: General Affairs and Planning Bureau, Sendei City, 2011.
JR East had 27 trains operating on the Tohoku Shinkansen Line when the earthquake 
occurred. The EEDS performed as designed. The Shinkansen’s EEDS includes 97 
locations in the JR East territory, including 15 coastal (front-facing) sensors belonging to 
the JMA’s EEW, and over 80 wayside sensors placed at 20 to 25 km (12.43 to 15.54 mile) 
intervals. When the P-wave hit the first coastal sensor, the sensor transmitted a signal to 
the substation, and the electricity to the rail line in the disaster area was cut off. Within 
three seconds, the power supply was cut, and within three more seconds, the brakes for 
the trains in the area were automatically applied.162 The trains slowed from 275 kilometers 
per hour (171 mph) to just over 70 kilometers per hour (43.5 mph) by the time the S-wave 
and the surface waves hit the line. As a result, no high-speed trains derailed.163 
 
Figure 8. Location of Shinkansen Trains when the Earthquake Occurred
Source: Kanno, 2013.
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Following the Kobe Earthquake and the 2004 Shinkansen derailment, JR East took some 
new mitigation measures to prevent derailments. L-shaped rail car guides were installed. 
Viaducts were retrofitted to prevent shear failure, so damage was limited to some bending,164 
which allowed rapid repair and restoration of service. Retrofits to the bridges, viaducts 
and tunnels provided additional seismic resistance, so there was no major destruction 
to the infrastructure. More than 1,000 sites did require repairs, but by April 29, 2011, the 
Tohoku Shinkansen service was fully restored, with repairs on the stretch from Sendei to 
Ichinoseki, which sustained the highest level of shaking, completed last.165
Conventional rail lines in the earthquake area sustained damage due to shaking at 
approximately 4,400 sites. Fortunately, JR East had acquired earthquake insurance in 
2005 after the Chuetsu derailment (2004), which covered 71 billion yen in earthquake-
related damages.166
Unfortunately, because the conventional trains ran along the coast serving isolated 
villages, seven train lines suffered severe damage from the tsunami as well. These include 
the Senseki Line, Ishinomaki Line, and Joban Line, which lost a total of 27 stations.167 
Reporters described photos of the post-tsunami damage as showing “trains tossed around 
like discarded toys.”168 Five passenger trains were swept away by the 38 m (124-foot) run-
up of the tsunami wave, but no lives were lost, thanks to rapid evacuation of passengers 
and crew following the earthquake.169 By April 27, most of the JR East conventional lines 
had been restored, however 325 km (202 miles) of rail line along the coast was still out 
of service.170 These coastal routes were also within the exclusion zone for the Fukushima 
Nuclear Power Plant’s ongoing disaster, so it is difficult to evaluate the full extent of the 
damage. Early estimates suggested that the damage would exceed the 164-billion-yen 
losses from the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake.171 Some routes may be realigned 
once the government’s regional recovery plan is clear.
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Table 6. Damage to Tohoku Shinkansen from March 11, 2011 Earthquake
Major Damage Number of Locations (approximate)
Damage to electric poles 540
Broken overhead lines 470
Damage to concrete piers 100
Damage to tracks 20
Damage to transformer units 10
Damage to noise barriers 10
Damage to the ceiling board at stations 5
Gap in beams 2
Damage to bridge bearings 10
Damage to tracks in tunnels 2
Total damage sites 1,200
Note: 550 additional sites were damaged in the continuing aftershocks.
Source: Hiraoka, 2011.
Table 7. Damage to JR East Conventional Lines from March 11, 2011 Earthquake
Major Damage Number of Locations (approximate)
Damage to tracks 2,200
Damage to electric poles 1,150
Lost crushed stone ballast 220
Damage to platforms 220
Damage to embankments 170
Damage to signals 130
Damage to concrete piers 120
Damage to station buildings 80
Damage to tunnels 30
Damage to transformer units 30
Other 50
Total damage sites 4,400
Source: Hiraoka, 2011.
Table 8. Damage to JR East Conventional Lines from March 11, 2011 Tsunami
Major Damage Number of Locations (approximate)
Lost stations 23
Lost/submerged tracks (60 km/37.3 miles) 65
Lost/submerged bridges 101
Damage to tracks 210
Damage to electric poles 950
Lost crushed stone ballast 80
Damage to platforms 40
Damage to embankment 50
Damage to signals 80
Damage to concrete piers 30
Damage to station buildings 25
Broken overhead lines 10
Others 20
Total damage sites 1,680
Source: Hiraoka, 2011.
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Power posed another problem for service restoration. JR East has its own power plants 
that serve the Shinkansen, but the conventional trains get power from the public grid. Since 
the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant was out of service, the supply of power was curtailed. 
Other nuclear plants were taken offline for inspection after the earthquake, resulting in 
a 40 percent reduction in available electricity.172 This led to rolling blackouts that also 
affected train service. After negotiations, the power companies agreed to give the trains 
priority, but, in exchange, train service was reduced to conserve power consumption. This 
also did not resolve the problem of service to gates and signals at grade crossings, which 
are tied to the local power grids and subject to the same rolling blackouts as other town 
services. Rolling blackouts ended and full rail service was restored on April 8, 2011.173
Railroad staff in stations and on rolling stock had been trained to assist passengers with 
orderly exit from the train to safe locations, and the planning and training paid off: all 
passengers and crew were safely evacuated from the stopped Shinkansen trains.174
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VI. JR EAST’S MITIGATION SUCCESSES:  
LESSONS FOR CALIFORNIA
The California High-speed Rail Authority is building a rail system to link Los Angeles to 
San Jose through the Central Valley, with extensions to San Francisco and Sacramento. 
Since the route will cross the San Andreas Fault and other faults, as shown on the map, 
earthquake damage mitigation measures must be a critical component of system’s design 
and development. In addition, if mitigation measures are not applied, shaking from regional 
large earthquakes generated by these faults will affect and may derail trains anywhere in 
the system. The experience of JR East in the triple disaster on March 11, 2011, offers 
practical examples of effective disaster countermeasures.
 
Figure 9. CHSRA Route Map and Earthquake Fault Zone Map
Source: California High-Speed Rail Authority.
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EARTHQUAKE EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS 
Japan’s greatest earthquakes nucleate on the subduction zone off its east coast, where 
the Pacific plate dives beneath the North American plate. Oregon and Washington share 
a similar hazard, with the Cascadia Subduction Zone off their western shores. While 
lightly populated, northernmost California also abuts the Cascadia subduction zone; the 
heavily populated areas around the San Francisco Bay and Los Angeles are more directly 
threatened by the San Andreas Fault system – a transform fault that is capable of ruptures 
of long duration that can generate great earthquakes with magnitudes of 8.0 and above 
and high-intensity shaking.175 The Alfred E. Alquist Seismic Safety Commission issued a 
report on its visit to Japan following the Niigata Chuetsu earthquake, which suggested 
that “The State should make a detailed and interdisciplinary evaluation of Japan’s 
Earthquake Early Warning System, track its progress on how effectively it provides 
warnings to the public in Japan, and then evaluate the feasibility of implementation in 
California.”176 The success of the system in Japan’s largest earthquake demonstrates 
the effectiveness of both the JMA EEW public warning system (RTS) and the JR East 
EEDS (RTEE) Shinkansen protection system.
In a 2010 paper, Bose and Heaton of Caltech noted that most EEW systems in operation 
today use an algorithm with “a fixed time window of a couple of seconds of the seismic 
P-wave for a rapid estimate of the earthquake magnitude.”177 Application of this algorithm 
triggers the alarm used by JR East to shut off power to trains and apply the brake. 
Seismologists are dissatisfied with this approach because it does not characterize the 
length of the fault rupture, which is an important predictor of the ultimate size of the 
earthquake and associated duration of the shaking. The importance of this information 
was seen in the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake. The forecasted magnitude saturated 
at M 8.0, yet the actual magnitude was M 9.0. The duration and intensity of the shaking and 
the size of the impacted area are all critical factors for response and recovery operations. 
As Bose and Heaton state, “The decision on [how] the EEW system [should be designed] 
is clearly user specific, and depends on (1) the vulnerability of the considered facility, and 
(2) the costs of the case of over- or under-estimated ground shaking.”178 
RTEE AND RTS
Based on their experience, the Japanese have separated their earthquake warning systems 
into two categories: real-time seismology (RTS) and real-time earthquake engineering 
(RTEE), each with a distinct application. Nakamura and Saita suggest that RTS is needed 
to give the public and first responders information on “rational action after the earthquake 
has terminated” while RTEE “is necessary for immediate response after the earthquake 
occurrence or earthquake motion arrival.”179 They further differentiate the quality of 
information that is needed for each application, with RTS focusing on “highly accurate 
but not immediate information,”180 while RTEE needs a rapid alarm and intervention181 to 
prevent secondary disasters, such as train derailments. 
The Japanese therefore have two systems for earthquake monitoring. The large 
network operated by the JMA EEW collects data over a wide area to enable complete 
characterization of the seismic event while offering warning to the public and information for 
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emergency responders for post-quake countermeasures. Furthermore, RTS is essential 
for developing a greater understanding of the parameters of seismic events, which leads 
to more rapid seismic detection, leading in turn to further enhancements of the RTEE 
system. For RTEE, JR East operates its own EEDS, with along-the-railroad sensors to 
ensure rapid engagement of the electricity shut-off and braking of Shinkansen trains to 
prevent derailments. Nakamura and Saita (2007b) generalize the requirements of RTEE 
systems, listing six essential characteristics: They must be “fully automated,” “quick and 
reliable,” “small and cheap,” “independent of other systems,” “easy to connect to network,” 
and, for the alarm, accuracy is desirable but not essential.182 The Japan California High 
Speed Rail Consortium has published a document entitled “Shinkansen Technology for 
California High-Speed Rail,” highlighting aspects of Japan’s high-speed rail experience 
that can be applied in California. It recommends development of an Early Earthquake 
Detection System “where large earthquakes may be expected.”183
RTS systems are in use in countries with active seismic hazards, including Turkey, Mexico, 
Italy, Romania, Taiwan, and as a demonstration system in the United States.184 The American 
system, a joint RTS and RTEE system called CISN ShakeAlert is operated through the 
collaboration of several organizations having both academic and seismological expertise, 
including UC Berkeley, Caltech, and USGS, with the recent addition of the University 
of Washington. Their efforts are focused on furthering the scientific understanding of 
earthquakes and accurately estimating their magnitude, location, and level of damage. 
Commercial RTEE systems are also being developed in the United States, by Seismic 
Warning Systems (SWS) of Scotts Valley, California, among others. SWS products have 
been installed at 12 locations185 in the Southern California desert area adjacent to the active 
San Jacinto Fault and along other faults of the San Andreas system. Coachella Valley 
communities have experienced several earthquakes over the past century, including the 
M 6.6 Painted Hills earthquake in 1986 that caused damage in Palm Springs. Firefighters 
responding to calls had to begin their rescue operations by finding a way to open the doors 
of their fire stations. Today, seismic sensors installed by SWS at each of the stations ensure 
that its doors will open and that the firefighters are notified to expect shaking of Modified 
Mercalli Intensity 5 or greater. A unit is also installed in the Paso Robles fire department, 
where it provided a 10-second warning before the M 6.5 San Simeon Earthquake struck 
in 2003.186 
SWS installations, which are site-specific, cost $25,000 per unit187 and are based on 
the deployment of two sensors at the user’s site. When the sensors detect the arrival of 
a P-wave that portends significant shaking, they activate an alarm, which may include 
audible warnings and flashing lights, as well as automatically opening garage doors or 
interrupting industrial activities at the site. The alarm at SunLine Transit in Palm Springs, 
for example, triggers the dispatch center to issue a warning to bus drivers of impending 
shaking so they can safely stop their vehicles.188
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Figure 10. SWS QuakeGuard at SunLine Transit
Source: Frances Edwards.
 
Figure 11. SWS P-wave Sensor and Internet line at SunLine Transit
Source: Frances Edwards.
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Another SWS’ product QuakeGuard 300, has been installed at 40 locations other than fire 
stations in California, including “the Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory, NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Center and the day care center at Cisco’s 
California headquarters.”189 The company is proposing to network local sensors for a 
quicker response time at locations farther from the earthquake’s hypocenter because 
the networked electronic message would travel faster than the P-waves to more distant 
locations.190 They also plan to provide a $1,200-per-year subscription service for schools 
and a $2,500-per-year subscription service for hospitals.191
As mentioned earlier, the CISN ShakeAlert statewide demonstration early warning system 
includes both RTS and RTEE capabilities. The project is currently in Phase III, and involves 
the USGS, the California Office of Emergency Services, UC Berkeley, Caltech, the 
University of Washington, and more than 20 individual corporations and public emergency 
management organizations in the State of California. ShakeAlert uses the statewide CISN 
network as a backbone and will issue alerts to the public, government, and private sector 
organizations with no subscription fee required. One of the early adopters is the Bay Area 
Rapid Transit system (BART), which now automatically slows and stops its trains when 
alerted by ShakeAlert. Google has integrated ShakeAlert into its emergency operations 
center. San Francisco Department of Emergency Management is working with city agencies 
to facilitate integration of alerts, in particular with the San Francisco Fire Department (to 
open the fire station equipment bay doors), the Police Department, and with Public Works 
to enable workers on projects near heavy machinery to take safe action. San Francisco 
hospitals, data centers, hazmat facilities, and local airports are also developing automated 
procedures based on ShakeAlert warnings. These actions can be tailored to particular uses. 
More sensors will be needed to provide adequate monitoring for the 1,288-km (800-mile) 
route of CHSRA and nearby regions with earthquake hazards. In California an EEDS 
would have to be aligned with California’s fault lines, most of which are not off the coast, 
with the accelerometers placed to detect fault movement at the earliest possible instant. 
In addition, some sensors must be more broadly distributed to detect earthquake sources 
from more broadly spread or unknown faults, such as those that ruptured in the Sylmar 
(1971), Coalinga (1983) and Northridge (1994) earthquakes. The ShakeAlert early warning 
system, based on the stations of the CISN, has demonstrated the capabilities of such 
a system in both densely and less densely instrumented regions. In earthquakes that 
occurred inthe Greater Los Angeles area in the Spring of 2014, alerts were produced 
within 4.5 seconds of the quakes’ nucleation. More recently, in the August 2014 M 6.0 
South Napa earthquake, ShakeAlert produced alerts in 5.2 seconds, allowing actions 
5 seconds before the S-wave arrived in Berkeley, 8 seconds before the shaking hit the 
BART operations center, and 9 seconds before the waves reached the San Francisco 
Department of Emergency Management. BART trains would have automatically begun 
braking based on the alert, however BART operates only from 4:00 a.m. to midnight on 
weekdays and 6:00 a.m. to midnight on Sundays, so it was not in operation at 3:20 a.m. 
on the Sunday when the quake occurred. Studies exist to determine optimum spacing and 
technical specifications for new stations for a California EEDS.192 Determining the best 
locations for that equipment, to protect CHSRA from earthquakes on the San Andreas and 
other faults in California will require additional studies of fault and shaking hazards as they 
impact the CHSRA and will depend in detail on the exact location of the tracks throughout 
the proposed route. 
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Figure 12. Warning Contours for Real-time ShakeAlert Performance During the 
2014 Napa Earthquake
Note: System and telemetry upgrades as proposed for the full public system - would have resulted in a faster 
alert time, and a significant reduction in the diameter of the 0-sec. warning zone. 
Public Policy and Government Activities
In 2013 California State Senator Alex Padilla sponsored a bill “to create a statewide early 
warning system for earthquakes…(using) technology to outrun shock waves (and) …
using existing communications infrastructure.”193 This legislation provides support for the 
development of the ShakeAlert system, relying on the Governor’s Office of Emergency 
Services to identify funding sources by 2016.194
Local governments have also taken some initiative to develop EEW capability. According 
to a report to the Seismic Safety Commission on September 12, 2012, the standalone 
earthquake warning systems installed in the Coachella Valley starting in 2000 could be 
considered an RTEE.195 In 2009 the Coachella Valley Association of Governments (CVAG) 
partnered with the Coachella Valley Emergency Managers’ Association, three school 
districts, and SWS to propose the Coachella Valley Regional Earthquake Warning System 
(CREWS). Warnings are to be based on existing sensors and those to be installed at 
additional proposed locations. When the system is built, alerts could be issued to 136 sites, 
including fire stations, schools and public safety communication centers. The Riverside 
County Operational Area has also applied for a $1.5 million FEMA grant but has not yet 
received funding as of this writing.196
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Neighboring Imperial County used this model to apply for FEMA funds to create a similar 
regional earthquake warning system called Imperial County Regional Earthquake Warning 
System (ICREWS), which will partner with the neighboring CREWS.197 On April 4, 2010, the 
M 7.2 El Mayor-Cucapah Earthquake in Baja California caused “a seismic movement on 
multiple faults extending throughout the Salton Trough. The triggered surface movements 
were at distances up to 172 km (107 miles) from the epicenter.”198 The earthquake caused 
the strongest shaking in the Imperial Valley since 1892, resulting in liquefaction and 
permanent ground deformation, leading to long-term damage to fields.199
Damaged buildings and infrastructure included irrigation canals, schools, and downtown 
business buildings. The schools in Calexico were closed for 17 days for structural 
evaluation and repairs. The downtown business district was closed for 10 days, impacting 
even businesses in structurally sound buildings, while leaking gas mains were repaired. 
The water and wastewater facilities were damaged, reducing domestic water supplies by 
50 percent for several weeks. Roadways, bridge approaches, rail lines, embankments, 
water tanks, and pipelines were damaged, disrupting rail and road traffic.200 Fire Station 
1 in Calexico was damaged by the shaking. Fire Chief Pete Mercado reported that it took 
the fire station’s three-person staff 15 minutes to open the damaged bay doors and move 
the fire engine. Meanwhile they were receiving service calls for gas leaks, power outages, 
and structure fires.201
The Imperial County Operational Area, with help from CVAG, successfully applied for 
a $225,000 hazard mitigation grant under FEMA’s DR 1911, the El Mayor-Cucapah 
earthquake event, to fund the ICREWS. On April 25, 2014, Imperial County awarded a 
$250,000 contract to SWS to install sensors and warning devices to “deploy and maintain 
this, the nation’s first regional earthquake warning system. … ICREWS … initial partners 
include Imperial Co. Fire; Imperial Co. Sheriff’s Office; Cities of Brawley, El Centro, and 
Calexico Fire and Police Dispatch Centers; Calipatria Fire; El Centro Medical Center; 
and Pioneers Memorial Hospital.”202 The ICREWS system will place P-wave monitors at 
6-to-12-km (3.7-to-7.5-mile) intervals along selected faults. Notifications will issue audible 
alerts, open fire station doors, turn on lights, and display warnings on monitors in public 
safety and utility dispatch centers. User locations can add activities, such as starting 
emergency generators or executing system shutdowns.203
SEISMIC RETROFITTING OF INFRASTRUCTURE
JR East also achieved success with its modifications to infrastructure design to 
accommodate large earthquakes. These may also be relevant to the proposed California 
high-speed rail system. First, the Japanese system will be presented, with discussion of 
the methodology and key details about the design of the cars, rails and the supporting 
viaducts. This is followed by a discussion of how the practices and issues of the Japanese 
system might apply to a similar train system currently proposed for California. This review 
is based on documents and reports provided by JR East and referenced here.
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Methodology to Establish Operating Limits and Displacement Probability for 
Each Viaduct 
The paper by Shimamura and Yamamura204 explains the methodology used to brake and 
shut down the high-speed Shinkansen trains, which can reach speeds up to 350 km/h 
(217 mph). 
The steps described in this paper do not explain all of the details but do describe the 
general methodology. This level of information is insufficient to duplicate the system, but it 
does provide some guidance that could be implemented in California. The following steps 
led to the evaluation of aspects of the seismic mitigation measures. 
First the investigators developed a ground motion attenuation relationship characteristic 
of the area. In the US, ground motion attenuation relationships are now called ground 
motion prediction equations, or GMPE. They estimate the decrease in maximum ground 
motion as the site’s distance from the causative fault increases. The maximum expected 
ground motion is, in addition, based on the magnitude of the quake, the type of faulting 
and the type of ground at the site. GMPE are used to estimate shaking at the site of the 
infrastructure. For bridges/abutments it is important also to estimate both the longitudinal 
(track parallel) and lateral (track perpendicular) response. A GMPE from Japan may not be 
relevant to California, but a number of GMPE exist for the Western US and California. The 
Japanese GMPE uses a constant of h = 0.20. The SI (Spectral velocity integrated between 
0.1 and 2.5 seconds) value was used as an index to evaluate the seismic demand. Values 
of SI were calculated for various earthquakes, resulting in SI ranging from 10 to 100. 
Next, typical viaducts (overhead bridge/type supports for the high-speed rail) were selected 
for evaluation. Static nonlinear analyses were performed for each of these representative 
viaducts. Two orthogonal directions, parallel and perpendicular to the tracks, were analyzed 
in order to establish the capacity of each of these typical viaducts. Displacement limits 
for four levels of damage were calculated. Time-history analyses were then performed, 
with input time histories matching the 19 values of SI, and target displacements were 
established. Damage probability/fragility was then determined for each viaduct, for four 
levels of damage/displacement.
The stable operation of the cars was then inserted into the analysis, with some assumptions 
about operating vibration frequencies, and the running stability established of 70 mm. With 
operating car displacement limits established, the maximum horizontal displacement of the 
difference between cars (operating) and viaduct (seismic) was established. A logarithmic 
displacement probability was then computed, for each of 19 SI values. Using the fragility 
curves, SI values, and the stopping distances, a level of damage is assigned for each 
viaduct. The methodology not only provides the logic to quickly slow down the trains, it 
also provides logic for inspection/repair and serves to reduce post-event downtime.
Because Japanese conditions are different from California conditions, numerous variables 
must be considered to evaluate the information for possible California application. All of 
these variables are specific to the location where the HSR is built and the specific types of 
equipment purchased.
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Table 9. Variables Needed for Seismic Damage Assessment
• Performance values of capacity for various levels of damage
• Running stability of cars (70 mm or other value)
• Operating speed (normal and braking)
• Braking performance
• Earthquake measurements/accelerometers (P- and S-waves)
• Pre-determined capacity limits for various levels of damage
Train Derailment Mitigation Methodology – Shinkansen JR Trains
Engineers for the JR East Shinkansen high-speed railway have taken measures to minimize 
the possibility of a derailment during an earthquake. Rollover prevention devices (called 
“sleeper plugs”) have been installed on tracks and L-shaped railcar guides added to trains. 
These devices work together to help keep trains from leaving the track. Expansion joints 
in tracks, which could allow the track to separate and potentially derail a train, have been 
removed. The company has also planned for thermal (longitudinal) expansion of rails and 
provided a means to safely accommodate it.
Structural Modifications and Ductility of Viaducts 
A paper by Kobayashi, Mizuno, and Ishibashi205 outlines the damage and restoration 
of Shinkansen structures after the Great East Japan Earthquake. The earthquake 
damaged the reinforced concrete (RC) viaduct columns and reinforced concrete bridge 
piers; however, no collapse was observed. According to seismic performance, the failure 
modes of the RC viaduct were categorized as either of two types: shear failure or flexure 
failure. Due to the damage caused to JR East structures, JR East implemented a seismic 
rehabilitation program. The methodology behind seismic rehabilitation is to prevent shear 
failure of the RC viaduct columns, which could result in their collapse.
After the Great East Japan Earthquake, the columns were observed to have experienced 
only flexural damage. This damage was then categorized by the degree of damage of 
RC members and restorability as shown in Table 10. Seismic damage to RC viaducts 
was mainly found in the upper end of the columns. The RC columns did not suffer level-A 
damage and the percentages of BB, B, and C are around 0.1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 
0.3 percent. The percentage represents the ratio of the number of damaged RC columns 
to the total number of RC columns. JR East implemented seismic rehabilitation to RC 
columns. Several options that were considered included steel plate jacketing, rib-bar and 
single-face methods.
Table 10. Seismic Damage Categories for Columns and Piers
Category Description
A Collapse of columns, fall of girders
BB Significant deformation of longitudinal bar, widespread fall of cover concrete, settlement of railroad track
B Some amount of deformation of longitudinal bar, widespread fall of cover concrete, no settlement of the 
railroad track
C Cracks in cover concrete, partial fall of cover concrete
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Damage to the RC railway bridge piers was also investigated. It was observed that the 
damage was located at the cutoff of the longitudinal reinforcing bars. There was no 
observation of shear failure; only partial fall of cover concrete and cracks occurring at the 
cutoff of rebar. The seismic damage level category of the RC bridge piers was determined 
in a manner similar to that used for the RC viaduct as shown in the table above. Review 
of the reports suggests that there was no damage in the bridge piers at levels A and BB. 
For levels B and C the percentage was about 0.1 percent and 0.2 percent (considering the 
number of damaged RC piers to total number of RC piers). The rehabilitation method used 
for most of the RC piers was RC jacketing. 
JR East’s restoration of the Shinkansen RC structures was performed quickly. The most 
rapid retrofit was completed in one day, and the longest was completed within 49 days of 
the earthquake. The restoration of RC viaducts and bridge piers took priority. The tasks 
were sequenced according to the damage level of the structural members. 
Applicability of JR East Mitigation Measures in California
California follows two major structural codes relating to railway infrastructure: Seismic 
Design Criteria (SDC) published by Caltrans and a code published by the American 
Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA). The codes require 
that columns and piers be designed to experience ductile behavior through the use of a 
plastic hinge at the deck soffit or above the ground interface. The seismic criteria ensure 
ductile behavior by requiring no shear failures, no collapse, special reinforcement detailing, 
and capacity-protected design elements. Special reinforcement detailing and capacity-
protected designs are both needed to ensure that the plastic behavior occurs at a specified 
location. Special reinforcement detailing requirements are established to increase ductility 
and reduce the possibility of shear failure. When creating capacity-protected design, actual 
material properties, rather than expected material properties, are used in combination with 
overstrength factors.
The code requirements will produce a behavior similar to what was observed in the 
columns and piers after the Great East Japan Earthquake. No shear failures were 
encountered, no damage occurred to the deck, and there was no failure that led to 
collapse. There was deformation of the longitudinal bar and fall of concrete cover, both 
of which are ductility failures. 
The methodology of the JR East mitigation effort could be applicable to California’s developing 
high-speed rail system with some modifications. Japan-specific caveats and many other 
issues would need to be resolved. For example, the attenuation relationships used by Japan 
would have to be replaced with those applicable to California, which already exist. However, 
the “h” factor, the depth to the hypocenter, may be another site-specific variable. 
Comparisons of the experimental relationships to determine magnitude for Berkeley’s 
ElarmS early warning algorithm has shown that a single relationship can be used for all 
of California and Japan.206 A variety of ground motion prediction equations to estimate the 
decrease in shaking with distance from an earthquake epicenter or fault rupture surface 
exist for small and large quakes that occur in the Western US. 
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The nonlinear pushover analyses in the two directions (transverse/longitudinal) could 
easily be performed, along with the various time-history analyses, to determine the 19 
values of SI, and fragility curves could be developed for each of the viaducts. The running 
stability value of 70 mm is obviously dependent on the train system selected, and would 
have to be determined after the train system is selected.
Site-specific geotechnical information would also be relevant to this methodology, and 
although not mentioned, it is part of the nonlinear pushover and time-history analyses – 
and may increase or decrease the fragility of each viaduct. Variation between adjacent 
viaducts would also have to be considered, along with the separation distances. Possible 
differential settlement between adjacent viaducts may create another problem, not 
addressed by the JR East Shinkansen methodology. Also, any vertical acceleration and 
inertial effects are not treated in this methodology.
Rail and train specifics (e.g., allowable displacement of 70 mm) would depend on the final 
system design for both the rail and the cars. This would also include the “L-type” rail car 
guides that may be specific for the Japanese system.
The complete methodology is not described in sufficient detail to say that it could be 
replicated. Additional exchanges of information and system architecture would be required 
for the California system to use the same logic. However, the retrofitting strategies used 
in Japan can inform decisions and investments made during the initial construction of 
CHSRA infrastructure.
In addition to retrofitting structures such as piers, bridges, and viaducts, JR East and 
its railway partners in Japan also undertook anti-derailment and anti-rollover mitigation 
measures on the cars and rails, as noted above. This type of mitigation measure would 
have to be designed for the specific train sets and rail configurations. These techniques 
might each be useful for CHSRA, depending on the train equipment that is purchased for 
the system.
From FY 2013 through FY 2018, JR East has a new focus on “disaster-resilient railways.” 
This includes seismic reinforcement of “embankments, earth cuttings, arched elevated 
brick bridges and power poles, and measures to prevent the collapse of station platform 
ceilings and walls” in Tokyo, as well as continuing the “seismic reinforcement of elevated 
bridge columns and bridge piers … station buildings with 3,000 or more passengers per 
day, Shinkansen power poles … [and] increas[ing] the transmission speed of seismometer 
measurement data … and emergency power sources for our communication network.”207
Restoration of rail lines with tsunami damage has progressed more slowly as JR East 
has worked with local communities to integrate with their local planning. In addition, 
the disabled Fukushima nuclear plant continues to block access to a 20-km (12.4-mile) 
exclusion zone. The result is that FY 2013 saw unusable rail lines reduced from 400km 
(249 miles) to 250 km (155 miles). Bus rapid transit (BRT) systems are substituting for the 
damaged rail routes.208
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The success for JR East was that the trains had 70 seconds to slow down before the 
damaging “S” waves arrived; trains slowed from 270 km/hour (168 mph) to 100 km/hour 
(63 mph) and there was no derailment.209 The combination of operational, emergency 
braking logic and accelerometers to provide the “P” and “S” wave information served 
the Japanese system well, and their history of almost 50 years of continuous operation 
without a single fatality is commendable. JR East also provided a rapid assessment of 
damage, and this served to reduce downtime. The retrofitting of the system components 
and the installation of derailment and rollover deterrence limited the amount of damage 
to be repaired.
Applicability of JR East Staff Training Strategies to California HSR
Japan’s long experience with earthquakes and tsunamis has led to a robust level of 
emergency preparedness in areas prone to seismic events. The M 7.3 Ansei-Edo 
earthquake in Japan on November 11, 1855, resulted in the deaths of 16,000 – 20,000 
people in the capital city of Edo (now called Tokyo). Woodblock prints “displaying the 
destruction, and telling of the despair of the survivors”210 circulated around the world. The 
M 7.9 Kanto Plain earthquake of September 1, 1923, and its resulting fire, killed 143,000 
people.211 The Sendei area had experienced earthquakes, including the 1978 M 7.7 Miyagi 
earthquake,212 so the likelihood of seismic activity was well known. 
Each year on September 1 Japan commemorates the anniversary of the Great Kanto 
Earthquake with Disaster Preparedness Day. JR East uses this anniversary to hold an 
annual emergency response drill for its employees and passengers.213 All JR East employees 
are included: train crews, station employees and rail line workers. The Great East Japan 
earthquake’s fatality-free outcome demonstrates the value of a high level of employee 
training and preparedness. In addition, posters and signs in trains and stations, some of 
which are permanent, are a reminder to passengers of safety precautions to take during and 
after shaking, including safe exiting from the train and assisting other passengers.
A new emphasis on passenger care in FY 2013 includes the development of more detailed 
tsunami guidance, better signage, and the addition of an annual March 11 training day 
focused on tsunami evacuations. Recognizing that stations may be shelters of last resort 
for stranded commuters or disaster victims, JR East is stocking its 30 largest stations with 
“drinking water, blankets, and first aid kits for children and the elderly.” In FY 2014 it will 
expand these preparations to 170 stations.214
There is also a new emphasis on collaboration with local communities surrounding the 
stations. In addition to working on disaster preparedness, JR East is supporting community 
restoration through tourism. The program includes special offers to promote travel to 
restored tourist areas in the disaster region. The company also sponsors disaster tours to 
recovered areas and markets and fairs to promote the produce, products and crafts of the 
disaster area.215
California commemorates the M 7.9 April 18, 1906 San Francisco earthquake 216 and 
fire with local ceremonies. Previously, April was designated as a statewide Earthquake 
Preparedness Month, sponsored by the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services.217 
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California HSR could adopt the JR East anniversary strategy for training its employees and 
raising awareness among riders. April could be the time when every employee receives 
emergency preparedness refresher training. An annual drill on the April 18 anniversary could 
include passengers, as JR East does. Although California HSR is unlikely to be affected by 
a tsunami, aftershocks can cause tremendous damage. The ability of passengers to safely 
and quickly exit the trains and move to safe shelter could save lives.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The JR East experience in the Great East Japan Earthquake offers a series of useful 
lessons for the CHSRA as it develops its route, designs its infrastructure, and acquires 
its train sets. These lessons are depicted in Table 11. Collaboration with the California 
earthquake research community at USGS, UC Berkeley, Caltech and NASA’s JPL, and 
the private sector could lead to the installation of useful RTS and critical RTEE earthquake 
early warning systems. The BART experience is also paving the way for CHSRA application 
of faster computers, and more effective algorithms, such as ElarmS. CHSRA, will also be 
able to make use of the statewide prototype EEW system, ShakeAlert. Engineers can 
benefit from the strategies used by JR East to design the HSR infrastructure to be resilient. 
Emergency managers can emulate the universal employee training and passenger 
awareness programs.
Table 11. Lessons Learned from JR East EEW Experiences
EARTHQUAKE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
• EEW prevents derailments
• Automatic electricity shut-off and brake application are critical to success – seconds count
• Location of sensors in relation to the fault determines the length of the warning period
• Direct delivery of warnings to the public through mobile devices and computer screens enhances the value of 
EEW beyond the benefits of media-based notices
• EEW can be used for immediate protective measures as well as for understanding the event to manage the 
response most effectively
• Faster computers and more effective algorithms enhance the speed and accuracy of the EEW system
INFRASTRUCTURE RETROFIT
• EEW’s value depends on the resiliency of the built environment
• Periodic re-evaluation of infrastructure resilience is critical
• Timely retrofit of infrastructure elements enhances the likelihood of system resilience
• Infrastructure owners must learn from each new seismic event and upgrade, retrofit and replace critical 
connectors and supports to enhance resiliency
TRAINING
• Trained staff are essential to an appropriate response to the EEW alarm
• Exercises with staff and public maintain awareness of the appropriate response to EEW alarms
CHSRA leadership must invest in seismic safety for the long-term resiliency of the system. 
JR East has operated for over fifty years without an earthquake-related casualty because 
it has learned from each seismic event and continued to invest in improved systems and 
strategies. There is no quick fix or perfect design for seismic safety, just a path of thoughtful 
investment and proactive initiatives. Seismic safety must be a core value for CHSRA in all 
phases of its operation, and the experience of JR East can be instructive in how best to 
invest time and money for success.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
A.D. Anno Domini (current era) 
ANSS Advanced National Seismic System
AREMA American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association
ATC Automatic Train Control
BART Bay Area Rapid Transit (San Francisco Bay Area)
Berkeley University of California at Berkeley
Caltech California Institute of Technology
Caltrans California Department of Transportation
CGS California Geological Survey
CHSRA California High-speed Rail Authority
CISN California Integrated Seismic Network
Co. County
CREWS Coachella Regional Earthquake Warning System
CSMIP California Strong-Motion Instrumentation Program
CVAG Coachella Valley Association of Governments
DR FEMA Disaster Declaration designation (numbered)
EEDS Earthquake Early Detection System (JR East)
EEW Earthquake Early Warning 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (US)
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GMPE Ground Motion Prediction Equations
GPS Global Positioning System
GSN Global Seismic Network
HAZUS FEMA’s Hazards US mapping system
ICREWS Imperial County Regional Earthquake Warning System
IRIS Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology
JMA Japan Meteorological Agency
JPL NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory
JNR Japan National Railroad
JR East East Japan Railway Company
JR Tokai Central Japan Railway Company 
JR West West Japan Railway Company 
km kilometer
m meters
ms milliseconds
M Magnitude
mm millimeters
MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity
MPH/mph miles per hour
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
Mw Moment magnitude
MTI Mineta Transportation Institute
NASA National Aeronautic and Space Administration
NCEER National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research
NEIC National Earthquake Information Center
PAGER Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquake Response
P-wave Primary Wave
QCN Quake Catcher Network
RC Reinforced concrete
RTEE Real-time earthquake engineering
RTS Real-time seismology
SB California State Senate bill
SDC Seismic Design Criteria
SI Spectral velocity Integrated
S-wave Secondary wave
SWS Seismic Warning Systems, Inc.
UC University of California
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transportation modes. MTI’s focus on policy and management resulted from a Board assessment of the industry’s unmet needs 
and led directly to the choice of the San José State University College of Business as the Institute’s home.  The Board provides 
policy direction, assists with needs assessment, and connects the Institute and its programs with the international transportation 
community.
MTI’s transportation policy work is centered on three primary responsibilities: 
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
Research 
MTI works to provide policy-oriented research for all levels of 
government and the private sector to foster the development 
of optimum surface transportation systems. Research areas in-
clude: transportation security; planning and policy development; 
interrelationships among transportation, land use, and the 
environment; transportation finance; and collaborative labor-
management relations. Certified Research Associates conduct 
the research. Certification requires an advanced degree, gener-
ally a Ph.D., a record of academic publications, and profession-
al references. Research projects culminate in a peer-reviewed 
publication, available both in hardcopy and on TransWeb, 
the MTI website (http://transweb.sjsu.edu). 
Education  
The educational goal of the Institute is to provide graduate-lev-
el education to students seeking a career in the development 
and operation of surface transportation programs. MTI, through 
San José State University, offers an AACSB-accredited Master of 
Science in Transportation Management and a graduate Certifi-
cate in Transportation Management that serve to prepare the na-
tion’s transportation managers for the 21st century. The master’s 
degree is the highest conferred by the California State Uni-
versity system. With the active assistance of the California 
Department of Transportation, MTI delivers its classes over 
a state-of-the-art videoconference network throughout 
the state of California and via webcasting beyond, allowing 
working transportation professionals to pursue an advanced 
degree regardless of their location. To meet the needs of 
employers seeking a diverse workforce, MTI’s education 
program promotes enrollment to under-represented groups. 
Information and Technology Transfer 
MTI promotes the availability of completed research to 
professional organizations and journals and works to 
integrate the research findings into the graduate education 
program. In addition to publishing the studies, the Institute 
also sponsors symposia to disseminate research results 
to transportation professionals and encourages Research 
Associates to present their findings at conferences. The 
World in Motion, MTI’s quarterly newsletter, covers 
innovation in the Institute’s research and education pro-
grams. MTI’s extensive collection of transportation-related 
publications is integrated into San José State University’s 
world-class Martin Luther King, Jr. Library. 
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and accuracy of the information presented 
herein. This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation, University Transportation Centers 
Program and the California Department of Transportation, in the interest of information exchange. This report does not necessarily 
reflect the official views or policies of the U.S. government, State of California, or the Mineta Transportation Institute, who assume no liability 
for the contents or use thereof. This report does not constitute a standard specification, design standard, or regulation.
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